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Introduction 
The Yukon Territory (Yukon) has always held a special and unique place in the Canadian 
federation. From its inception during the Klondike Gold Rush to its current quasi-provincial 
status, Yukon has made a significant contribution to the development of Canadian federalism. 
Currently the Yukon Government controls a great variety of "province-like" powers, programs 
and responsibilities. Unlike the other territories in the Canadian federation, the Yukon 
Government controls the management of its lands and natural resources, including the ability to 
regulate and collect royalties. Indeed for all intents and purposes Yukon functions very much as 
a province. Like its northern neighbours, however, Yukon does not enjoy the same constitutional 
status as the southern provinces. Its existence as a distinct territory is derived from a piece of 
federal legislation, and like any other federal act, can be changed during any sitting of Parliament 
at the whim of the federal government. The constitutional status of Yukon, therefore, can be 
regarded as tenuous and contested. 
While the constitutional distinctions of a territory make it unique, the most remarkable 
feature of Yukon's political landscape is the existence of a third order of First Nation 
government. Any discussion of politics in Yukon would be remiss without mention of the variety 
and scope of First Nations governments that exist there. But the stratum of First Nation 
government in Yukon is more than simply another characteristic upon an already dynamic 
landscape. It represents an experiment in self-government that has and will continue to influence 
the progression of the concept of Aboriginal self-government in Canada. It represents an 
important attempt to reconcile the disparaged relations between First Nations peoples and the 
Canadian state by reconfiguring the political institutions that have caused significant disaffection 
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between the two. Finally, and probably most importantly, it represents an important part of the 
political structure under which all Yukoners, Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal, will live together. 
Despite these lofty goals and aspirations, First Nation self-government in Yukon is still 
very much an experiment. Except for a very few other examples in Canada that are only 
somewhat comparable, the self-governments in Yukon are embryonic institutions forged on 
relatively nascent principles. For all their originality and innovativeness they are equally as 
untested and unproven. Like any experiment they need rigorous examination and study to be 
better understood. This characterization is certainly not meant to trivialize or underestimate self-
governments, but is rather an acknowledgement of their importance and the need to improve the 
understanding of how they work. The hopeful intent is that closer examination and better 
understanding will precipitate enhanced function and superior performance. 
As a starting point, there is a clear gap between the system of First Nation governance 
envisioned in the Final Land Claims and Self-Government Agreements and the system as it 
currently exists. The agreements have yet to be implemented fully, or even close to fully. This 
means that there are a variety of policy fields which First Nation governments have the power to 
control, but have not yet assumed this power. For some, this implementation gap is one that will 
eventually be overcome if the necessary resources are invested. This paper, however, questions 
whether the current trajectory of implementation is in fact leading towards the system envisioned 
in the agreements. Using education policy in Yukon as a case study, this paper suggests that 
there appears to be a different relationship emerging between the Yukon Government and First 
Nation governments. It argues that in the policy field of education the Yukon Government and 
First Nation governments are moving towards a system of co-management, based on increased 
partnership and collaboration. 
2 
To make this assertion this paper will compare the current trajectory of the relationship 
between Yukon and First Nation governments through a co-management framework. This 
framework is based on the body of literature that discusses regimes of co-management by 
Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal governments over natural resources. It is comprised of four parts: 
the underlying rationale or origin for the regime; the structure of the regimes various bodies; how 
power and decision-making occurs; and how Aboriginal voice, or traditional methods and 
practices are incorporated. 
To assess education policy in Yukon I will examine government documents that have 
recently been developed, focusing particularly on the Education Reform Project conducted by 
the Yukon government in conjunction with the Council of Yukon First Nations. As well, I 
conducted interviews with senior government officials in Whitehorse in November, 2010. While 
the interviews were with Yukon government officials specifically, it should be noted that one of 
the interviewees had considerable experience working on behalf of individual First Nations and 
the Council of Yukon First Nations. 
This paper is divided into five chapters. The first, chapter provides some necessary 
background information and suggests that there is indeed a gap between the model of self-
government envisioned in the Final Land Claim and Self-Government Agreements in Yukon, 
and what is currently being practiced. The second chapter consists of a review of the literature 
regarding self-government in Canada. It outlines the significant theoretical debates regarding 
Aboriginal self-government in Canada, describes various models and frameworks that currently 
exist for explaining the relationship between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal governments, 
examines the discussions specific to the situation in Yukon, and finally provides an overview of 
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co-management literature and creates a framework of what co-management regimes in other 
policy fields look like. 
Ultimately it argues that there are no frameworks or models in the current suite of 
literature which accurately reflect the relationship between the Yukon and First Nations 
governments in Yukon, and suggests the co-management framework as a possible alternative. 
The third chapter reviews the current system of education in Yukon. It determines that while 
much of what is currently proposed remains unimplemented, there are some telling observations 
that can be made about the trajectory of education policy that suggest that a co-management 
regime is emerging in this policy field. The fourth chapter assesses those policies and their 
direction, through the framework of co-management. Finally the fifth chapter concludes that co-
management may be a helpful framework for characterizing the relationship between Yukon and 
First Nations governments within education, and suggests what this characterization means in 
terms of the gap between the current and potential models of self-government in Yukon. 
Self-Government in Yukon 
In order to understand the broader context in which this issue is situated, it is necessary to 
recount how it is that modern First Nations governments in Yukon came to fruition and provide 
some necessary background on their development to date. To do this we must recall the 
development of Aboriginal political organization in Yukon, the resulting comprehensive land 
claims process, and the signing of final land claims and self-government agreements. 
For the better part of the twentieth century, Aboriginal political organization in Canada 
was quite limited. Aboriginal peoples were defined as Indians under the federal Indian Act. As 
such, they were considered as wards of the state and their affairs were administered by the 
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Department oflndian and Northern Affairs. In most cases, including that of Yukon, Indians 
lacked the cohesiveness and organizational capacity to collectively press against a colonial 
regime that was at best paternalistic and at worst racist. When the Trudeau government however, 
proposed eliminating the special status for Indians and suggested a process of assimilating 
Indians into the rest of Canadian society with the 1969 White Paper, they were met with 
surprising resistance. In Yukon, and across Canada, resistance and outrage with the proposed 
White Paper provided the catalyst for the mobilization of regional Aboriginal political 
organization. Groups, like the Yukon Native Brotherhood, began to form with the express intent 
of pressuring the Canadian government to recognize Aboriginal rights, and title to lands and 
resources. Any initial hesitancy the federal government might have had in regards to recognizing 
those rights and titles seemed to be put aside following the ruling by the Supreme Court of 
Canada in the 1973 case of Calder vs. the Attorney General of British Columbia. In Calder, the 
Supreme Court, in a split decision, recognized the Aboriginal rights ofthe Nisga'a First Nation 
in British Columbia's Nass River valley. So it was in this context of the failed 1969 White Paper, 
and the decision made in the Calder case of 1973 that the comprehensive land claims process 
began in Yukon. 
Yukon's process of negotiating comprehensive land claims agreements with First Nations 
began, at least symbolically, with the issuance of the document entitled Together Today for Our 
Children Tomorrow, (YNB, 1973) to the Prime Minister by a group of chiefs lead by Chief 
Elijah Smith in 1973. The document outlined the social and economic ills faced by Yukon 
Indians and called for land, rights and political powers to be transferred to the Indian groups 
(Coates and Morrison, 2005: 289-92). While the federal government responded positively to the 
request, and did enter into negotiations, it would be several decades before any result would be 
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seen. The commensurate negotiations were bilateral, between the federal government and the 
Council of Yukon Indians (CYI). It was determined that success was more likely to be achieved 
if the individual First Nations (designated as Indian Bands at the time) negotiated together 
through one representative body: the CYI. However, as the public Yukon territorial government 
began to agitate for greater control of their own affairs, Yukon First Nations began to express a 
desire for representation in the negotiations. While the shift to trilateral negotiations made sense, 
it certainly complicated the already intricate negotiations. The three parties were able to 
negotiate tentative agreements twice in the following 20 years, but in both cases those 
agreements fell through (Cameron and White, 1995: 26-33). Needless to say, the tripartite 
negotiations were long, arduous, and very expensive. 
Breakthrough was made in the late 1980s and early 1990s when a 1989 Agreement in 
Principle became the Umbrella Final Agreement in 1991, and was finally signed by all parties in 
1993. The Umbrella Final Agreement (UFA) was a general framework agreement through which 
each individual First Nation would negotiate its own specific agreement with the federal and 
territorial governments. It stipulated a fixed quantum of land and compensation money from 
which each First Nation could make claim. As well, the UFA established a co-management 
regime in the territory, creating a variety ofboards, committees, and councils with guaranteed 
membership for First Nations people that would guide decision-making on both First Nation and 
crown land (Cameron and White, 1995: 29-30). Issues such as hunting and fishing, 
environmental regulations, and natural resource use all fell under the purview of these co-
management bodies. In addition to the co-management regime it created, the UF A called for the 
negotiation of self-government for First Nations. While each First Nation would negotiate its 
own final land claims agreement based on the UF A model, it was also to negotiate a self-
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government agreement. These self-government agreements were to be seen as companion 
agreements to the land claims agreements and would be negotiated concurrently based on a 
model agreement for First Nation self-government which provided a framework in much the 
same way as the UF A did for land claims agreements. An important distinction between the two 
companion agreements was that the final land claims agreements were to be protected as treaty 
rights under the auspices of section 35 of the Constitution, while the self-government agreements 
would not. 
With the UF A in place as a model for the negotiation of final land claims agreements, 
and the model agreement as a framework for self-government negotiations, First Nations in 
Yukon began to negotiate, sign and attempt to implement these modern and very unique 
agreements and structures. The first four First Nations to sign agreements saw them come into 
force in 1995. Since then 11 of Yukon's 14 First Nations have signed agreements and begun to 
implement their respective self-governments. The complexity and breadth of the self-government 
agreements offers a sense of the scope of the task. 
While each government is unique, we can turn to one of the first four, the Champagne 
and Aishihik First Nation (CAFN) Self-Government Agreement, for an example of some ofthe 
key aspects. First of all, in the preamble and principles section, it states that the CAFN has 
"traditional decision-making structures" and will incorporate them with "contemporary forms of 
government" (section 2.2) which will be defined by a CAFN Constitution (10.1). It also, 
importantly, makes clear that CAFN citizens will no longer be considered "Indians" as defined 
by the Indian Act (3 .5) and that the CAFN Band will cease to exist (9.1). The agreement makes 
clear that the CAFN government has the power to enact primary legislation on a broad variety of 
matters. While it is not necessary to reprint the entire list here, a selective list of the areas over 
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which the CAFN government can legislate includes: cultural beliefs and practices, language, 
health services, social welfare, child care, education, and justice (13.2). As well, the CAFN 
government has full control of the management and ownership of all natural resources, both 
renewable and non-renewable, on their settlement land. It is also worth noting that if the CAFN 
enacts legislation that overlaps with Yukon legislation, the First Nation legislation is paramount. 
Since the majority of programs and services contemplated by the self-government 
agreements are currently provided by the Yukon government, the agreements suggest a process 
to allow the First Nation government and the Yukon government to negotiate their transfer. 
These Program and Service Transfer Agreements (PST As), factor in the funding arrangements 
vis-a-vis the federal government as well. So if the Yukon government receives federal funding 
for a program over which the First Nation government wishes to assume control, the funding is 
redirected from the Yukon government to the First Nation. It is not hard to imagine that these 
funding aspects of the PST As might factor importantly into the transfer negotiations. 
The Current and Potential Models 
There is little doubt that the self-government agreements reached in the Yukon Territory 
are significant achievements. As mentioned above, they represent an important reconfiguration 
of the relationship between First Nations people and Canadian political institutions. In theory 
they provide Yukon First Nations with a type of self-determination that is almost unrivalled in 
Canada. If one considers the extent of powers available to them in their self-government 
agreements, First Nations have the ability to exercise powers that are very similar to that of a 
province. These extensive powers cannot be overstated. They create the potential for 15 different 
governments (14 First Nation and one public) within the Territory. This could mean 15 different 
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suites of programs and services within the same policy field. While this may seem unimaginable 
for a Territory of only approximately 33,000 people, it is certainly a possibility. But it is 
important to remember that most of these powers that are available to First Nation governments 
have not yet been implemented. The programs and services that have been taken on by the First 
Nations do not yet match up with the ambitious model that is envisioned in the treaties. 
Explaining why such comprehensive powers have not been implemented is tantamount to 
understanding the very nature of First Nation self-governance in Yukon. 
To better explain this situation, a helpful analytical distinction can be made between what 
is outlined in the agreements and what is being practiced on the ground. On one hand, the 
agreements offer a model of governance that is available to the First Nation governments. This 
model can be described as the "potential" model, in which the First Nation exercises the 
maximum allowable powers and provides the maximum in terms of programs and services that 
are permitted by their self-government agreements. In every policy field contemplated by the 
self-government agreements, the First Nation assumes control from either the Yukon or federal 
government. On the other hand, the "current" model reflects the situation in practice. In this, the 
"current" model, the First Nation provides a few select programs and services that it has 
negotiated from the Yukon or federal government. Those few programs and services are 
designed to supplement rather than completely replace those provided by the Yukon government. 
As will be demonstrated in the field of education, the current model is based on important 
collaboration with the Yukon government. In order to better understand this gap between the 
current and potential models, a better explanation of this collaborative relationship between 
governments is necessary. 
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Literature Review: Seeking the Right Tools 
Introduction 
The first step in assessing the relationship between governments in Yukon is to review 
the literature that already exists on the subject. While it is important to note what others have 
argued and discussed, it is equally important to note what has not been discussed and where there 
are gaps in the literature. This section will proceed by reviewing and categorizing existing 
literature about self-government in Canada. 
It will begin with the broadest category, in which there are discussions and arguments 
about the theoretical debates, normative concepts, legal fundamentals, and philosophical 
foundations of self-government. In this group, we find concerns about the source of authority of 
First Nation governments and the nature of their relationship with the Canadian state. 
Following this is a body of literature that shares its overarching subject, but differs in 
approach. This group continues to deal with the nature of self-government, but tends to focus 
more on how self-governments are structured, how they operate on the ground, and how they fit 
into intergovernmental structures like that of the Canadian federation. In this sense they deal 
with more practical and empirical questions of how newly self-governing First Nations will fit 
into Canadian federalism. While these tend to focus on writ-large Canadian issues, there are 
unique issues that exist in the Yukon. The third category contains the Yukon-specific literature 
and examines these unique issues that exist at a territorial level. Finally, a category of self-
government literature that has emerged as its own niche is the literature dealing with regimes of 
co-management over natural resources between First Nation and Canadian governments. 
Although the co-management framework has only been applied to natural resource use, this 
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framework and the issues outlined in the literature on co-management provide a useful 
framework to analyze the co-management of education policy in Yukon. 
Theoretical Debates on Aboriginal Self-Government in Canada 
The debates and discussions surrounding Aboriginal self-government in Canada have 
changed and evolved significantly over the decades. Often, these debates and discussions 
develop in response to changes in government policy (or lack thereof), and involve either 
affirming or rejecting those policies. As discussed above, it started in many ways with the 
mobilization of Aboriginal political organizations in the late 1960s. In Canada the rejection of 
the White Paper of 1969 is usually pointed to as a catalyst for this organization, but some argue 
that it was very much a global phenomenon of Indigenous nationalism and agitation against the 
colonial structures imposed on them by expanding European empires (Coates, 2005). 
Aboriginal nationalism was more than simply a strategic tool for the development of 
Aboriginal political organization. Michael Murphy argues that Aboriginal nationalism is in fact 
"deeply principled," and is an expression of the desire of Aboriginal peoples to determine their 
own political destiny and negotiate new relationships with other governments on the principles 
of co-equality and mutual consent (Murphy, 2005: 9). In this sense, the right to Aboriginal self-
government rests on a series of normative principles. Patrick Macklem offers a helpful 
enumeration of these philosophical arguments upon which the right to self-government rests 
(Macklem, 1995). He argues that there are in fact five specific normative dimensions to this 
right: prior occupancy, prior sovereignty, treaties, self-determination, and the preservation of 
minority culture. Although Macklem presents the strengths and weaknesses of each of these 
arguments, he does not suggest that any of them are sufficient justifications for the demands of 
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self-govermnent on their own. Instead he points out that they are "intersecting justifications," 
and that the right of self-government is best defended by them in combination and synthesis 
(Ibid: 40-41). 
On the part of the Canadian government, court decisions like Calder reinforced the need 
to deal with Aboriginal claims of rights and title (Coates & Powell, 1989: 110). While the dual 
forces of Aboriginal nationalism conveyed through Aboriginal political organizations, and the 
reality of court-recognized Aboriginal title led to the beginning of the land claims process in the 
Yukon, Aboriginal policy in the rest of Canada did not develop in stride. Instead, self-
government remained an area of cautious study for the government. One particular turning point 
came in 1983 though, when a House of Commons special committee chaired by MP Keith 
Penner issued a report that recommended the establishment and recognition of Aboriginal self-
government. In their account of the development of the idea of self-government, Yale Belanger 
and David Newhouse suggest that the Penner Report marked a transition in thought about self-
government (Belanger and Newhouse, 2008). They claim that the report represented a shift in the 
debate from one of principles and rationale for self-government, to one about how to make it fit 
within the Canadian federation (Ibid: 2). Despite the assertion of this shift, they suggest that the 
drive for constitutionally based Aboriginal self-government precipitated two key questions "that 
still steer the self-government debate: (1) should Aboriginal self-government be considered a 
third level of government?; and, (2) what is the source of power for Aboriginal self-governments, 
and is the source of power more of a barrier to agreement than the range of such powers?" (Ibid: 
12). 
With those questions surely in mind, the Mulroney government established the Royal 
Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (RCAP) in 1991 to gather information, deliberate and 
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provide recommendations on the future of Aboriginal self-government in Canada. The RCAP 
report produced in 1996 contained volumes of information, testimonies and facts, as well as 
hundreds of recommendations for the federal government. While it is not possible to review 
them all here, some of the fundamental issues regarding self-government should be noted. The 
RCAP posited a nation-to-nation approach to Aboriginal-state relations in Canada and suggested 
a new relationship based on modem treaties with First Nations. It suggested that self-government 
was an Aboriginal right that should be recognized and protected. However, any momentum that 
Aboriginal groups may have perceived from the RCAP quickly dissipated, as the report was 
basically shelved by the federal government upon receiving it. 
Since the mid-1990s, the federal government has shied away from "big-picture" 
Aboriginal policy. However the academic and political debates that developed in response to 
both the Penner report and the RCAP report continue to feature in the landscape of self-
government literature. Much of the literature that can be considered in the "theory" group comes 
in response to the two questions posed by Newhouse and Belanger above. These refer to the 
nature of the third order of government, and the source of power or authority of Aboriginal self-
governments. For some, self-government in the sense envisioned as a third order of government 
within the Canadian federation is unacceptable. These forms of governance are inherently un-
Aboriginal and therefore are simply another form of colonialism imposed on Aboriginal people 
by the Canadian state (Alfred, 2005). For other Aboriginal scholars, the source of the right to 
self-government is the point of contention. Often, they do not envision Aboriginal people as 
existing within the Canadian federation or within Canadian political institutions. In this sense, 
they are sovereign nations with a nation-to-nation relationship with the crown established by the 
original treaties between their ancestors and the British colonizers (Ladner, 2003; Henderson, 
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1994; 2008). Often this group of authors refers to the relationship as being represented by the 
Two-Row-Wampum belt, which shows Aboriginal peoples and Canadians travelling down the 
same river together, but in their own respective boats. The two exist cooperatively in the same 
space, but are autonomous and do not interfere with each other (Tully, 1995). This type of treaty 
federalism (Ladner, 2003; Henderson 1994) or treaty constitutionalism (Tully, 1995) is, 
according to proponents, the only legitimate relationship in terms of legal norms and history. 
On the opposite side of these discussions, are those who criticize the viability of 
Aboriginal self-government and use of the term 'nation' by Aboriginal peoples (Cairns, 2000; 
Flanagan, 2000). For Tom Flanagan the term nation is inappropriate for Aboriginal groups. He 
argues this based on the size of each First Nation group, the composition of the groups, and his 
sense of their historical development (Flanagan, 2000). He argues that it is infeasible for powers 
of self-government to be vested in these groups; rather they should undergo some sort of benign 
assimilation into the mainstream Canadian society (Ibid.). Alan Cairns undertakes a similar 
criticism, but for different reasons and with a very different conclusion (Cairns, 2000). Cairns 
criticism stems from the effect self-government will have on the Canadian nation and Canada's 
collective citizenship (Ibid.). He explains that as a result of the Canadian government's historical 
goal of assimilation, "many members of First Nations accord limited legitimacy to the major 
institutions of the Canadian constitutional order" (Cairns, 2005: 22). They view Parliament with 
"suspicion and wariness," are alienated by the constitution, ambivalent towards the charter, and 
have an "uncertain citizenship" (Cairns, 2005: 23-32). In Cairns view, it seems that this problem 
should not be underestimated as a significant barrier to improving Aboriginal-state relations in 
Canada. Despite this, he is hesitant to endorse self-government as a remedy. He argues that self-
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.. 
government will create parallelism within Canadian citizenship or a further sense of differentness 
that will only exacerbate the citizenship problem, not solve it (Cairns, 2000: 190). .. .. 
{ 
Alan Cairns criticism of nation-based self-government is well respected, but not without ::, 
.,; 
critics of its own. Some argue that his fear of parallelism in Canadian citizenship is overly 
exaggerated because of his conception of citizenship as "shared identity". Melissa Williams 
argues that rather than a citizenship regime based on the concept of a single shared identity, 
Canadian citizenship should be based on a sense of shared fate (Williams, 2004). This focus 
leans on the idea that citizens recognize that their actions directly affect others and that their lives 
are very much interdependent (Ibid.). Grounded in this idea of citizenship, Marc Hanvelt and 
Martin Papillon argue against Cairns idea that self-government will foster differentness, and 
counter that self-government offers Aboriginal peoples a way to "break in" to Canada on their 
own terms (Hanvelt and Papillon, 2005: 253). In other words: "From this point of view, self-
government does not preclude the ties that bind, it simply constructs them on a different basis: 
not on a shared identity but on mutual recognition" (Ibid.: 252). Self-government then, will allow 
Aboriginal peoples to negotiate their relationship with the Canadian state, and thus make an 
important step towards legitimizing Canadian institutions. Self-government, in this sense, can be 
considered the vehicle for achieving a more cohesive Canadian citizenship that includes 
Aboriginal people. 
In sum, these arguments are important in terms of understanding the broader theoretical 
and conceptual debates surrounding Aboriginal self-government in Canada. Collectively, they 
provide an understanding of the normative dimensions, legal issues, and philosophical 
underpinnings of self-government in Canada. They elucidate debate about issues, like 
citizenship, which are fundamental to the more abstract questions about how we as peoples are to 
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live together and about what types of relationships are appropriate. What they do not do 
however, is offer concrete solutions to the problems they present. More specifically they offer 
little help or guidance for First Nations that do already have forms of self-government. In 
situations where First Nations have negotiated modern, comprehensive land-claim and self-
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government agreements, like in Yukon, the broad theoretical debates outlined above offer little 
material that is of practical use to either First Nation or non-First Nation governments. This is 
because, rightly or wrongly, the questions raised in these debates have largely been answered. 
The majority of First Nations in Yukon have entered into agreements which give shape and 
definition to the relationship between their governments and other Canadian governments. These 
"Final" agreements are protected under the Canadian constitution. So in the case of First Nation 
self-government in Yukon, the debates outlined above represent the arguments of yesterday. As 
they move forward with implementing the land claim and self-government agreements, the First 
Nation and Yukon governments face a new series of challenges and debates that remain largely 
unaddressed. 
Structuring Relationships 
Within the body of literature on Aboriginal self-government in Canada, there are those 
who have attempted to bring structure to the debates about the relationship between self-
governing First Nations and the mainstream Canadian political structures. Often these come in 
the form of frameworks that can be used to characterize those relationships. Most commonly 
these are framed through the lens ofvarious models of federalism (Abele and Prince, 2003; 
Baier, Bakvis and Brown, 2009; Wilson, 2008). Others propose certain articulations of these 
relationships, but fail to provide the necessary structure to make them useful. Alan Cairns for 
instance proposes a relationship based on the metaphor of"citizens-plus" where Aboriginal 
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peoples share a common Canadian citizenship but continue to enjoy supplementary rights and 
duties vis-a-vis the Canadian government (Cairns, 2000). While the intent is to "enhance the 
compatibility between Aboriginal nationhood and Canadian citizenship," (Ibid.: 213) and 
downplay the parallelism of self-government, the proposal, which is absent of structure, is of 
little practical use. 
Despite claims to the contrary, critics of Cairns offer little practical or substantive 
structure in response. Hanvelt and Papillon argue (2005: 251) that "in practical terms, the idea of 
nation-based self-government suggests a complex relationship in which Aboriginal nations are 
embedded in a broader Canadian context." While this sounds promising, this argument that 
Aboriginal nations are somehow embedded in the Canadian political structure also lacks 
structure. This lack of structure makes analyzing the proposal impossible. 
There have been however, proposals that provide clarity and structure about the 
relationship between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal political structures. In two distinct yet very 
much interrelated articles, Francis Abele and Michael Prince establish frameworks for explaining 
these relationships. In the first they provide a three-level framework as an analytical approach for 
understanding and explaining the linkages which comprise the relationships (Abele & Prince, 
2002). First of all, there is the "high politics" of Aboriginal-state relations which comes in the 
form of constitutional reforms, judicial rulings, and land claims (Ibid.: 228). This level tends to 
draw most academic attention. The second level is the "mid-range politics" which is represented 
by the broad policy strategies employed by the governments, like financial arrangements and 
political accords (Ibid.: 230). The final level is the "on-the-ground-politics" of actual policy 
making, and the provision and management of programs and services (Ibid). While this level 
seems to be the least studied and understood, it is probably the most important to the average 
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First Nation citizen. They do note though, that despite there being three distinct levels, they are 
inter-connected in many ways (Ibid.: 231 ). For example, often what happens on the ground 
drives the positions of leaders at the level of high politics and the structure of the mid-range 
politics defines how policies will play out on the ground. 
Based on these three levels of linkages between First Nations and other governments, 
Abele and Prince provide a framework for describing how First Nation governments fit within 
the Canadian federation. They conclude that there are in fact four distinct pathways, or models, 
to self-government in Canada which explain the various conceptions about the roles of self-
government and their relationships with other Canadian political institutions (Abele & Prince, 
2006). To delineate between the four models they establish a set of criteria for each. 
The first of these models characterizes self-governments as "mini-municipalities" (Ibid: 
572). As such the self-government would provide a "range of programs and services to their 
relatively small populations, use a representative electoral system, possess a modest power of 
taxation, and own-source revenue" (572). They would be seen as junior governments with the 
federal government playing a supervisory role, reviewing and possibly rejecting bylaws. The 
relationship would then be modeled on that between the provinces and municipalities; authority 
would thus be delegated by the federal government. 
The second model conceives of adapting the current forms of federalism to fit Aboriginal 
governmental aspirations. In this model, a new form of public government would be formed as a 
consequence ofthe renegotiation of an Aboriginal collectivity's relationship with the federation 
(574). So while it would represent a new relationship, it would represent a specifically 
Aboriginal level of governance. The Aboriginal aspect of this government would result from the 
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demographic realities of the respective region. The creation of the territory ofNunavut provides 
an example of this model. 
The third model envisions the creation of a distinct third order of government in the 
Canadian federation. This third order government would have the ability to make and enforce 
laws, deliver programming and policy, and adjudicate disputes (576). There would be certain 
areas where the self-government would have exclusive jurisdiction, while other areas would be 
shared, or overlapping with other governments. It is important to note though, that these 
governments would exist within the Canadian federation and the source of the authority for 
legislative power would sit with Canada and transferred to the Aboriginal government (578). 
The final model is based in part on the treaty federalism notion mentioned above. It 
suggests that the relationship between Aboriginal self-governments and the Canadian state is one 
of two sovereigns engaged in a treaty-based relationship (579). In this model, the powers and 
authority ofthe Aboriginal government exist outside of the Canadian structure, and do not 
require the legitimization from the Canadian state. The two governments then, are autonomous 
and should not interfere with each other more than necessary. 
Each of these models posits a very different conception of the link between First Nation 
and mainstream Canadian governments. In each model several features are considered. These 
include normative issues, like the source of Aboriginal sovereignty, and the status of citizenship, 
as well as more practical issues, like the powers Aboriginal governments exercise, the policy 
fields they control and the programs and services they provide to their citizens. So to use this 
framework, it is necessary to examine a First Nation government by looking at those criteria and 
judging which model most accurately reflects the situation. 
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Following in this pattern of providing structural explanations of the placement of an 
Aboriginal government within the Canadian federation, Gary Wilson proposes another possible 
framework. Wilson argues that the development of an autonomous Inuit region, Nunavik, within 
the province of Quebec constitutes a new phase in the development of Canadian federalism 
(Wilson, 2008). Using the Russian model of nested federalism, Wilson explains that the 
autonomous form of public government used in Nunavik can be characterized as being "nested" 
within the Province of Quebec. He notes that some ofthe linking mechanisms between the 
regional and provincial governments are yet unresolved, but suggests that the model could serve 
as a template for other regional (Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal) governments in Canada. The 
public government in Nunavik is not explicitly a form of Aboriginal self-government, but its 
demographic reality certainly makes it so in a de facto sense. So while the model is not 
necessarily intended to be limited to the context of Aboriginal self-government, the absence of 
other examples certainly suggests it can be considered in this context. 
The relationships between First Nation and mainstream Canadian governments explained 
in this section provide some clarity and structure. While some are more explicit than others, they 
all provide various conceptions of how, once created, Aboriginal governments could fit into the 
Canadian political structure. It should also be noted that the models tend to reflect the underlying 
normative assumptions about the nature of Aboriginal government of their authors. The models 
are either intended to apply broadly to all First Nations in Canada, while others are specific 
models for specific cases. However in either case, their applicability to the situation in the Yukon 
is questionable. 
Often, as is the case with Abele and Prince's four models, they explain the suite of 
powers exercised by an Aboriginal self-government, the policy fields they control, and the 
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programs and services they provide, and thus categorize them appropriately. The problem with 
these frameworks then, is that they tend to overlook the reality of cases where Aboriginal and 
other mainstream Canadian governments share power or jurisdiction, occupy the same policy 
field, or work together to provide programs and services. These cases come about either by legal 
agreement, necessity, or simply due to the fact that limited implementation of the agreements 
creating Aboriginal self-governments has not occurred. All three of these cases seem to be in 
effect in the Yukon. First Nation governments in Yukon have yet to implement many of the 
powers available to them under their self-government agreements, so they work together with the 
Yukon government to exercise certain powers. The result of this is that First Nations 
governments have become complexly intertwined with the Yukon government. This complexity 
leads Yukon First Nations governments to defy these models of Aboriginal self-government. It is 
very difficult to accurately assess which of Abele and Prince's four models apply, whether they 
are parallel to or are embedded within the Canadian political structure, or whether or not they are 
"nested" within the Yukon. Indeed it would seem that a framework which accounts for 
Aboriginal and other governments sharing policy fields, jurisdictions or powers might be needed 
to better explain and understand the relationship between Yukon First Nation governments and 
the territorial government in Yukon. 
First Nation Self-Government in Yukon 
To better understand the dynamics of implementing self-government in Yukon, we can 
tum to the literature that focuses on the Yukon specifically. This is a limited body, but one from 
which some important observations can be made. These relate both to the conclusions that 
authors have drawn about implementing self-government in Yukon, as well as the normative 
assumptions about self-government upon which they are based. 
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Prior to the completion of the Umbrella Final Agreement in 1993 and the first Final Land 
Claims Agreements in 1995, the discourse in Yukon was focused on the colonial nature of the 
relationship between the federal government and Aboriginal peoples. While the relationship 
between the Canadian state and Aboriginal peoples is quite commonly referred to as colonial, it 
is worth nothing that some observers have characterized Canada's relationship with its northern 
territories as colonial, or that Yukon (and the Northwest Territories) have historically been 
treated as an internal colony of Canada (Coates 1985; Dacks 1981; Smyth 1992; 1996). So for 
some, the development of First Nation self-government was simply one part of the overall 
constitutional development of Yukon (Smyth, 1992). Steve Smyth argued that in order for the 
Yukon Territory to continue to develop constitutionally (i.e. towards provincial status), it must 
deal with the outstanding Aboriginal claims for self-government (Smyth, 1992). The rejection of 
colonialism can be seen as something faced by both Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people in the 
Yukon. In this sense, the driving force behind the process of land-claims and the establishment 
of self-government was not limited to Aboriginal groups. 
While most argue that land claims and self-government represent the reconfiguration of 
Aboriginal-state relations, and displace the colonial regime imposed on First Nations, there are 
some who disagree. Paul Nadasdy for instance, argues that the land claims process and the 
resulting political structures it created (co-management and self-government) are simply a form 
of neo-colonialism (Nadasdy, 2003). In his view the underlying assumptions and practices of 
these new regimes are inconsistent with First Nation beliefs and practices and in fact undermine 
the very way of life that they seek to preserve (Ibid.). Despite this very critical assessment, 
Nadasdy is unable to suggest any changes or reforms to the structures. He argues that any sort of 
solutions to these problems require a radical restructuring of Aboriginal-state relations in the 
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Yukon. This type of criticism is important to acknowledge, but offers little useful material for 
explaining the relationship between self-governing First Nations and the Yukon government. 
Proponents of the system of First Nation self-government naturally offer a different view 
that provides some insightful observations. They explain the use of the Yukon model as a guide, 
either as a way of demonstrating how self-government could be created in the current 
constitutional framework (Hogg and Turpel, 1995), or how modem treaties could be negotiated 
(Penikett, 2006). Those who have taken a closer look at how the implementation of the self-
government agreements has progressed have noticed some problems that can help to explain the 
current situation. According to Gurston Dacks the primary constraint for the fuller 
implementation of the powers outlined in the self-government agreements relates to the financial 
terms of First Nation governments assuming programs and services from the Yukon or Canada 
(Dacks, 2004). He argues that the practical problem of implementation is not "the legal and 
conceptual basis on which different governmental forms rest, but rather their dependence on 
funding transfers from another government" (Ibid.: 690). In other words the reliance of First 
Nation governments on other governments to pay for them to provide programs and services is 
what has constrained them. So there is a direct link, according to Dacks, between a First Nation's 
financial capacity and their ability to exercise the powers of self-government. Financial capacity 
can be seen as a significant factor in the gap between the current model of self-government and 
the model envisioned in the Self-Government Agreements. 
Ken Coates and William Morrison offer a similar examination of the implementation of 
self-government in Yukon. They examine how self-governments have been implemented and 
seem to extend a plea for lower expectations of what self-government may accomplish (Coates 
and Morrison, 2008). They argue, that self-government should not be viewed a panacea for the 
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socio-economic problems of Aboriginal people and suggest a number of factors that inhibit First 
Nation governments from providing the kinds of programs and services contemplated in the Self-
Government Agreements. One of these relates to capacity, or more specifically "the personnel 
and local resources necessary to administer their affairs ... " ( 116). Thus, First Nation 
governments are limited by the capacity of their members to exercise some of the broad powers 
contemplated in their self-government agreements. They also note the factor of time as a 
constraining force. The self-government agreements are not solutions that will necessarily bear 
fruit immediately, but are intended to change long-term trajectories of socio-economic problems. 
Put simply "deeply imbedded problems and crises will not be overturned in a year or even a 
decade" (120). 
To review, there are a few important conclusions that can be made about this literature. 
First of all, there seems to be a clear link between the constitutional development of the Yukon 
Territory and the development of First Nation self-government. Their respective development is 
both mutually dependent and mutually reinforcing. Also, this literature suggests several factors 
that can be attributed to limiting the implementation of self-government in Yukon. Of these, 
fmancial constraints, human capacity, and time seem to be the most evident. These three factors 
are telling, first of all about the implementation of self-government in Yukon, but also about the 
underlying assumptions of the authors that present them. Both Dacks (2004), and Coates and 
Morrison (2008) present the factors above as inhibiting First Nations governments from 
exercising a much greater degree of power, and providing a more fulsome suite of programs and 
services to their citizens, as contemplated in the Self-Government Agreements. This assumes 
first of all that the "potential" model as envisioned in the agreements is indeed tenable, 
achievable, and desirable for First Nations, and that if those factors were addressed somehow, 
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First Nations could actualize that vision. In a sense, this assumption suggests the Self-
Government Agreements represent a schematic of what Yukon First Nation governments will 
ultimately look like once fully implemented, and thus what powers, programs, and services will 
be exercised by the First Nation governments and what will be exercised by the Yukon 
government. This general assumption is important, and will be returned to later. 
The final observation that can be made about this Yukon-specific literature is that it lacks 
any analysis of specific policies or policy jurisdiction. This is not surprising given the 
observation by some that there is indeed limited scholarship relating to the actual practice of self-
government (Murphy, 2005: 8). An examination of a particular policy field would be helpful in 
confirming the assumption noted above, that First Nations are proceeding towards the model 
envisioned by the Self-Government Agreements. More generally it would also elucidate a better 
understanding of the overarching relationship between First Nation governments and the 
Territorial Government in the Yukon. 
Co-Management Regimes 
In various parts of Canada, particularly the northern regions, non-Aboriginal government 
agencies work with Aboriginal peoples cooperatively to manage various natural resources. 
Typically these arrangements have found their genesis in comprehensive land claim agreements, 
like that ofNunavut, or those in Yukon. The resulting co-management regimes are intended to 
give greater control over the management of natural resources to Aboriginal peoples and can be 
seen as a component of Aboriginal self-government. A relatively well-developed body of 
literature examining these co-management regimes has come to form a distinct sub-section of the 
literature on Aboriginal self-government in Canada. This literature is helpful for two reasons: it 
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provides policy-specific study of the relationship between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal 
governments, and is an example of a policy jurisdiction that is shared by those governments. 
As mentioned, these regimes exist in the territorial north as a result of comprehensive 
land claims processes, but examples can also be found in British Columbia and northern Quebec. 
Typically they remain strict in their coverage to a narrow set of natural resources, but those 
natural resources can vary greatly, from Dall sheep in the mountains of south-west Yukon 
(Nadasdy, 2003; 2005) to beluga whales off the northern coast of Quebec (Tyrell, 2008). 
Regardless of the exact resource they govern, co-management regimes are seen as a form of, or 
at least an element of, self-government. Graham White goes as far as to argue that co-
management boards are "a new genus of institution within Canada's federal system, existing at 
the intersection of the three orders of government" and inasmuch, the realization of treaty 
federalism (White, 2002: 94). Others see the type of jurisdictional sharing exhibited in co-
management regimes as an alternative to, or an interim measure in lieu of more fulsome self-
government (Penikett, 2006: 217). Either way, the literature relating to co-management 
represents a departure from other contemporary self-government literature by delving into the 
realm of cooperative sharing of jurisdiction, rather than creating frameworks for how stand-alone 
Aboriginal self-government units will fit into the Canadian political structure. So it appears that 
the corpus of literature relating to co-management may provide some helpful lessons for better 
explaining and understanding the development and function of Aboriginal self-government 
proper, especially in the Yukon, where the model of self-government has defied other 
frameworks. 
The typical pattern that academics pursue in analyzing co-management regimes is to 
examine a case study and make general observations about the process and regime as a whole. 
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While the case studies may vary considerably in the nature of the respective resources, as stated 
above, the authors tend to draw conclusions that can be applied broadly to co-management 
regimes as a whole. So despite the seemingly different subject matter, the general body of 
literature relating to co-management is quite uniform in terms of structure. 
In general, this literature can be grouped into two distinct categories. On one hand, there 
are those who argue that despite the intent, co-management regimes actually have the effect of 
furthering cultural assimilation of First Nations (Stevenson, 2004: 68) rather than empowering 
them. This is because co-management regimes require First Nations to adopt western ideas and 
bureaucratic structures, which are inherently incompatible with First Nation culture, in order to 
participate (Nadasdy, 2003; 2005). According to Paul Nadasdy, this bureaucratization of First 
Nations actually extends state power rather than empowering First Nations as is the intent of co-
management (Ibid.). On the other hand, there are those authors who concede several problems 
with co-management regimes (specific to their respective cases, and in general) but conclude that 
they have been relatively successful in allowing First Nations a participatory role and a voice in 
decision-making that was previously absent (Netro and Simmons, 1995; Tyrrell, 2008; Usher, 
2003; White, 2001; 2002; 2008). These authors outline various problems with co-management 
regimes but all tend to arrive at the conclusion that the arrangements put their First Nation 
participants in a better position than they had previously occupied. Despite the obvious 
disagreement between these two groups they do, together, provide an adequate anatomy of co-
management regimes. From both groups a set of common features can be gleaned which will 
form the basis of a framework for examining co-management in the field of education. 
While they often disagree about the ultimate value, role, and effect of co-management, all 
of the literature on the subject remains relatively consistent on what particular elements are 
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necessarily important. In each respective review of co-management regimes, there are four 
elements which tend to be discussed as fundamental. Put simply the four aspects are: origin, 
structure, power, and voice. 
Origin 
The first element relates to the origin of the co-management regimes. In other words, why 
did the parties seek such arrangements and why did they structure them the way they did? At the 
most basic level there is a sense, as there is with other Aboriginal self-government discourse, that 
the creation of co-management is "embedded within a broader narrative of Canadian 
colonialism" (Tyrrell, 2008: 327). In other words, allowing First Nations a participatory role in 
the management of natural resources represents a type of redress for the unjust, paternalistic 
government policies of the past. Both in terms of the general overall relationship, and case-
specific policies, co-management is often tied to a response to historic wrongs perpetrated by the 
government on Aboriginal peoples (Ibid.: 328). While this explains the ideational impetus for 
creating co-management regimes, their specific structures have a more practical source. White 
argues that co-management "boards' common origin lies in political compromise" (White, 2002: 
97). Both the Aboriginal groups and the (federal) government had to make some concessions. 
The government was reluctant to relinquish its jurisdiction (Cameron and White, 1996: 30) and 
argued that public lands should remain under public control. Aboriginal groups wanted to 
maximize "control over as many facets of land use, environmental protection, and wildlife 
management as possible" (White, 2002: 97) but were also hesitant about "the prospects of 
finalizing a land claim" (Ibid.: 98). 
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Although in the case of the Yukon, the co-management regime came about as a result of 
a general land claim (the Umbrella Final Agreement), each First Nation had to negotiate its owns 
specific final agreement, so it is likely that the hesitancy of the Inuit that White noted could have 
also applied to Yukon First Nations as well. Put more simply, Aboriginal peoples were keen to 
test the waters with co-management before leaping into a more comprehensive land claim or 
self-government agreement. The need to find common ground between the status quo of 
continued unilateral federal management and the desire of Aboriginal peoples to manage the 
resources themselves meant both groups had to compromise. Ultimately the manifestation of this 
political compromise lay in the structure that co-management boards would assume. 
Structure 
While the structure and composition of co-management boards and committees varies 
considerably, there are some notable commonalities that are discussed throughout the literature. 
In most cases they are tripartite boards with members nominated by the Aboriginal group, and 
the territorial and federal governments. They are structured to provide guaranteed Aboriginal 
participation which usually includes half the seats designated for representatives from the 
respective Aboriginal organization. While each member is appointed by a specific party, a 
fundamentally important feature of co-management boards is that they are independent from any 
other government body. This means "members are to act 'in the public interest' and not take 
direction from the parties that nominated them" (White, 2008: 73). The boards are often staffed 
with their own secretariat and can commission their own research to ensure independence from 
government. The federal government often provides the funding for these boards, which has led 
some authors to question whether or not this impinges on the boards' independence (White, 
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2008). Whether or not this is true, the theoretical intent is to allow them to maintain their 
independence. 
Those who are critical of co-management regimes point out problems with the boards' 
structure. Nadasdy argues that the structure of co-management boards extends the power of the 
state over First Nations, rather than empowering them (Nadasdy, 2003; 2005). Regardless of this 
disagreement over the end effect of co-management, most authors focus on the structure of the 
boards as a key element of co-management regimes. 
Power 
One of the most contentious aspects of the co-management literature is the issue of 
power. In other words, does co-management give Aboriginal peoples real decision-making 
power over the management of a given resource? The debate usually centers on the distinction 
between co-management boards' role making recommendations or providing advice, rather than 
making decisions. This usually means that the ultimate decision-making authority rests with the 
Minister. Paul Nadasdy offers a scathing appraisal of this power structure: 
they make recommendations, not decisions, and those recommendations must be 
implemented (or not) by politicians and bureaucrats whose actions are judged by 
standards that have nothing to do with First Nation peoples' knowledge and values and 
everything to do with the exigencies of the wider political and economic situation 
(Nadasdy, 2005: 225). 
There are some who do not share this sentiment though, and view the advisory role in a more 
important light. For Peter Usher, government' s relinquishment of exclusive authority over 
management and regulation suggests the relationship can be characterized by cooperation 
(Usher, 2003: 379). Netro and Simmons argue that while some co-management bodies are 
"technically an advisory body," they actually wield "real authority" (Netro and Simmons, 1995: 
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170-72). In this sense the Aboriginal groups exercise a "negative option"; that is their 
recommendations are accepted completely unless the Minister expressly overturns them. To do 
this the Minister must act within a limited time frame and must explicitly state in writing the 
reasons for overturning the recommendations. Such a move would be expensive in terms of 
political capital and puts the onus on the Minister to explain the decision. So, while many boards 
can only provide advice to the Ministers of the Crown, "it is advice with a difference" (Ibid.: 
171). 
Voice 
The final component of the literature relates to whether or not Aboriginal people are able 
to exercise their "voice" on co-management boards. This relates more to the process of reaching 
a decision rather than the decision itself. The question can be reworded as: Are Aboriginal ways 
and methods of expressing and sharing knowledge and information properly incorporated into 
the co-management structure? As above, the answer to this question varies considerably 
throughout the literature. 
The western/bureaucratic structure of the boards serves to undermine Aboriginal voice 
according to Nadasdy. It forces Aboriginal people to "think, talk, and act in ways that are 
incompatible with (and even serve to undermine) the very beliefs and practices" that it is 
supposed to be safeguarding (Nadasdy, 2003: 3). Tyrrell adds that in some cases Aboriginal 
contribution to the management process is not taken seriously and that some groups feel they are 
a part of co-management in name only (Tyrrell, 2008: 328). She notes that, "the language of the 
hunter and of the village is excluded from the co-management table while the language of 
management, policy, and science are privileged," (Ibid.: 330). Tyrrell's criticisms, however, are 
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specific to the case she is studying, and she freely admits that there are other examples of co-
management regimes in Canada which "have provided a voice to (Aboriginal people) and have 
opened a space where (Aboriginal people) and scientists/policymakers can work together to 
understand each other's viewpoints" (Ibid: 332). In his examination of co-management boards in 
various parts of the Canadian North, White agrees that Aboriginal voice is being heard, and that 
Aboriginal traditional knowledge is "taken seriously by land-claims boards and significantly 
influences their decisions and recommendations" (White, 2008: 80). 
Conclusion 
While specific observations and conclusions are drawn throughout this review of 
literature, some are worth repeating. First of all, while there is a breadth of debate about the 
philosophical, normative, and legal aspects of Aboriginal self-government there are very few that 
link these to practical examples of existing systems. In the case of the Yukon many of these 
debates are dated, and offer little to improve our understanding of both how First Nation self-
governments are currently operating or the nature of their relationship with the Yukon 
government. 
Secondly, of the various frameworks that attempt to explain and structure the relationship 
between Aboriginal self-government and mainstream Canadian governments, none seem to 
accurately characterize the situation in Yukon. The complexly intertwined nature of the 
relationship between Yukon First Nation governments and the Yukon government defy 
explanation by these frameworks. This is at least partly because they do not adequately address 
the notion of policy jurisdictions being shared or cooperatively managed. While some scholars 
have studied the Yukon specifically, they have remained quite general in their scope and have 
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not examined specific policy fields to inform their work. Their conclusions tend to suggest that 
the Self-Government Agreements in Yukon represent an end goal to which First Nations should 
strive. This is based on the assumption that that goal is indeed achievable, tenable, and desirable. 
Finally, a general framework can be created based on the body of literature that examines 
how Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal governments co-manage various natural resources. This is a 
framework that is based on actual existing systems, where Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal 
governments cooperatively manage a specific policy field. It would seem that this framework 
may be useful for examining other policy fields where collaboration between Aboriginal and 
non-Aboriginal governments occurs. We can now turn to one such policy field: education. 
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Education in the Yukon: From Paternalism to Parallelism to Partnership 
Introduction 
In order to assess the usefulness of the co-management framework outside the field of 
natural resources, it is necessary to apply it to an actual policy field . One such field is education. 
Over the past decade, there has been increasing collaboration between the Yukon Government 
and First Nations governments in this policy area. This chapter will begin by outlining the 
reasons why a co-management framework can be applied to education policy. It will then assess 
the current situation relating to education policy in Yukon by examining particular government 
documents, as well as information and opinions garnered through interviews with senior 
government officials in the Yukon. Two interviews were conducted with Yukon Government 
officials responsible for managing the relationship between the Yukon Government and First 
Nations governments. Collectively the government documents and interviews with officials will 
provide an understanding of the current management of education in Yukon and its future 
trajectory. 
Why Education? 
If a particular policy must be selected as a case study from which to draw conclusions 
about the overarching relationship between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal governments in 
Yukon, there are none better suited than the policy field of education. There are two central 
justifications for this claim: the role that the legacy of education policy has played in the 
relationship between Aboriginal peoples and the Canadian state; and the importance of 
educational policy to Aboriginal peoples and its centrality in the drive for self-government. Both 
of these arguments are particularly striking in the Yukon. 
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The historical legacy of federal Aboriginal educational policy on the continuing 
relationship between the Canadian state and Aboriginal peoples has been particularly destructive. 
It has been widely acknowledged that the federal system of residential schools had a disastrous 
effect on Canadian Aboriginal people (Battiste, 1995; Milloy, 1999), in particular on their 
languages, culture, and sense of identity. Federal recognition and acceptance of these claims 
were made at the highest level, when Prime Minister Stephen Harper provided an official 
apology for the damaging effects of the residential school system to Aboriginal culture, heritage, 
and language (Prime Minister's Office, 2008). Furthermore, the federal government has created a 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission specifically to document and better understand those 
effects (Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 2011). The negative effect of this legacy on the 
relationship between the Canadian state and Aboriginal peoples cannot be understated. In the 
most negative sense, this relationship has often been characterized as "colonial' (Cairns, 2000: 
19-23) and indeed the residential schools policy has been "the most damaging of the many 
elements of Canada's colonization ofthis land's original peoples" (Milloy, 1999: xiv). This is 
particularly evident in the Yukon. 
Even before the residential school system began, what little education policy that existed 
was outright negligent. As Coates puts it, Yukon Aboriginal peoples were deemed by the 
government to be "marginal people living in a marginal part of the country," and did not "receive 
a workable education system" (Coates, 1986: 147). Once the residential school system began in 
the 1950's (Ibid: 133), the situation changed but did not improve. Yukon Aboriginal children 
became forced participants in the program of residential schools. The resulting cultural and 
spiritual dislocation of residential schools has been suggested as a cause for a number of social 
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problems, as well as educational shortfalls that have plagued Yukon's Aboriginal peoples 
(Rosalyn-Ing, 1990). 
Secondly, education policy is of particular importance to Aboriginal peoples and can be 
linked to the struggle for self-government. While the effects on individual survivors of the 
federal residential schools policy are troubling in and of themselves, they also created a more 
endemic challenge for Aboriginal peoples. The damage done to generations affected by 
residential schools and their descendants represents an existential problem for Aboriginal 
identity. So it is unsurprising that they have "placed such a high priority on regaining control 
over the education of their children" (Barman, Hebert, McCaskill, 1986: 1). Likewise, it explains 
that Aboriginal peoples "have made control over education a central component of a more 
general campaign for political self-determination" (Ibid.). This sentiment is echoed by the 
Assembly of First Nation's National Chief Shawn Atleo, who has identified education as central 
to their agenda, and "directly related to social and economic health and ... other priorities like 
stronger governing capacity and economic development" (AFN, 2010). While these provide 
some strong practical reasons for Aboriginal interest in education, and the link to self-
government, there are more abstract reasons as well. 
The history of federal education policy for Aboriginal peoples is sown with seeds of 
colonialism and paternalism and is understandably a cause of the mistrust many Aboriginal 
people have towards the Canadian state. This mistrust has been translated into a "profound 
alienation of most Aboriginal peoples from Canadian political institutions and Canadian 
citizenship" (Hanvelt and Papillon, 2005: 243) and has thus become part of the impetus for self-
government. Once again, this is particularly evident in the Yukon. The failure of the education 
system in the Yukon to serve the needs of the Aboriginal population played a strong role in the 
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development of Aboriginal political mobilization. When the Yukon Native Brotherhood (later to 
become the Council of Yukon First Nations) issued their seminal document Together Today for 
Our Children Tomorrow in 1973, demands for reform of the education system were at its core. 
Within the main body a section devoted to education suggested that if real reforms were not 
made, Aboriginal students would continue to suffer (YNB, 1973: 20-21). In an attached 
appendix, the YNB outlined a proposal for a series of recommendations that they wished to see 
implemented within the Yukon education system. The intent of this proposal was to create a 
"more workable system and render the development of a Separate Indian School System 
unnecessary" (YNB, 1973: 50). 
While education was obviously an important component of the document, it is probably 
best known for beginning the process of comprehensive land claims in Yukon. It spurred the 
federal and Yukon governments to begin negotiating final land claim agreements with Yukon's 
First Nations, which would ultimately include the development of self-government. So there is a 
clear link between the development of self-government in Yukon, and the dissatisfaction of 
Yukon Aboriginal peoples with federal and territorial education policy. 
Education Policy in Yukon 
In the absence of any academic literature about the current relationship between First 
Nation and Yukon governments related to education, it is necessary to tum to government 
documents to assess the situation. Supplemented by interviews with government officials, these 
documents provide a helpful approximation of the direction that the management of education in 
Yukon is moving. 
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Education policy in Yukon faces many of the same challenges that exist in other parts of 
Canada. There are challenges associated with mral/urban divides, the integration of French 
language and culture, and the integration of religious content. Additionally, Yukon faces the 
challenges associated with the existence of self-governing First Nation governments that have 
the legally-entrenched ability to assume the responsibility for the design, delivery, and 
administration of education. To review briefly, the Umbrella Final Agreement, which provided a 
template for each of Yukon's 14 First Nations to follow in the creation of their own Final Land 
Claims and Self-Government Agreements, outlined the role of First Nations governments in 
education. The UF A contemplates the devolution of programs and services dealing with "Yukon 
First Nation authority for the design, delivery and management of Indian language and cultural 
curriculum;" (Section 24.3.2.1) and "the division and sharing of Yukon First Nation and 
Government responsibility for the design, delivery and administration of programs relating to: 
a. Indian student counseling 
b. Cross cultural teacher/administrator orientation 
c. Composition of teaching staff 
d. Early childhood, special, and adult education curriculum 
e. Kindergarten through grade 12 curriculum 
f. The evaluation of teachers, administrators, and other employees." (24.3.2.3) 
Despite the considerable power this seems to afford First Nations over education, the Yukon 
government continues to fully exercise this authority, and no First Nation has entered into 
negotiations to assume these powers. 
Throughout the past decade, the Department of Education of the Yukon government has 
undertaken several exercises to investigate how to better involve First Nations in education. The 
most comprehensive of these was the Education Reform Project (ERP), which produced its Final 
Report in 2008. The ERP consisted of an extensive review of past educational studies, 
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recommendations and consultations with First Nations, as well as further consultations with First 
Nations and other targeted partners, groups and individuals (ERP, 2008: vii). Its Executive 
Committee which guided its progress was comprised of the Chair ofthe Yukon Chiefs Council 
on Education, Joe Linklater, the Chief of the Liard First Nation, Laird McMillan, and the Yukon 
Minister ofEducation, Patrick Rouble. The commensurate Final Report of the ERP consists of 
background information about First Nation self-government and education, and a series of 
recommendations about how the system should be reformed. While the parts of the report that 
deal with First Nation-specific issues are the focus of the report, it does naturally contain much 
more than just material specific to First Nations such as various community issues, support for 
teachers, administrators, and students. These are obviously important issues for the education 
system, but for the purposes of this paper, attention will be limited to those recommendations 
pertaining to the First Nation government-Yukon government relationship, proposed governance 
structures, and the general role of First Nations in education. Put simply, the Final Report 
discusses the history, current status, and vision for the future of education policy in the Yukon 
from the perspectives of both First Nations and the Yukon Governments. 
The Final Report starts with a discussion of the history of First Nations education in 
Yukon, and suggests that due to the negative historic relationship between First Nations and the 
education system, First Nations children face unique challenges in the current school system. 
This includes the lack of recognition of"cultural knowledge" and "traditional teachings" (Ibid.: 
B.3) which makes the system seem to First Nations to be "unresponsive and non-inclusive" 
(Ibid: vii). In interviews, some government officials also noted the indirect effects of the legacy 
of residential schools on Aboriginal children. That is, the mistrust felt by their parents and 
grandparents towards the school system is reflected in their children. As a result of these issues 
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the report argues that the system must be "structured in a way that allows for participation and 
input by First Nations people" (Ibid.: B.3). 
According to the report the fundamental step forward for education policy stems from the 
creation of an "effective partnership between the Government of Yukon and First Nations, based 
on a mutually respectful approach" (Ibid.: 1.1 ). The basis for this relationship seems to be that 
the two levels of government both have authority over education, even though the Yukon 
government currently exercises this authority (Ibid.: B.6). In other words, as a result of the land-
claims and self-government agreements First Nations now share responsibility for education, but 
none have begun negotiations towards assuming control of this policy field and the Yukon 
government continues to actually provide all of the programs and services related for education. 
Government officials interviewed also agreed that the creation of a "meaningful partnership," 
was indeed the desired relationship between Yukon and First Nations governments (Interview 1, 
2010). One official suggested that there was an ongoing debate amongst First Nations people 
between those who wanted "their own schools" and those that wanted to see a single public 
system based on a "meaningful partnership" between Yukon and First Nation governments 
(Interview 2, 2010). 
So, based on this new "partnership" over the jurisdictional field shared by the two levels 
of governments, the ERP final report proposes a new governance structure which is intended to 
be a "bottom-up, participatory model" (ERP, 2008: 1.7). It is expected to have the following 
characteristics: 
facilitating a broad community input in education; 
providing First Nation representation; 
shifting many decisions away from the Department of Education; 
senior administrative support; and 
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facilitating educational decisions based on instructional, not political, needs. (Ibid: 
1.11) 
The report suggests that the proposed structure be general in scope and subject to change, 
so details on the roles of various bodies remain unclear. Although lacking detail, the proposed 
structure does offer some telling information about the report's intended vision. It argues that 
four particular groups are specifically important: an Education Executive Committee; a Yukon 
First Nations Education Committee; an Education Consortium; and enhanced school councils. 
The details of the composition of each group do not need to be reiterated in detail, but in general 
each of the three latter groups would report and provide recommendations to the Education 
Executive Committee. This committee would be comprised of the Minister ofEducation, the 
Chair of the Yukon Chiefs Committee on Education, and the Chair of the Education Consortium. 
The First Nations Education Committee would be comprised of representatives from each of the 
eight First Nations language groups in the Yukon. The Education Consortium would be a large 
group with representatives from each of Yukon's First Nations, as well as other groups such as 
teachers, and federal and territorial officials. The school councils, which would be responsible 
for creating the policies related to the day-to-day operations of the school, would be elected 
locally. Based on the recommendations provided by the three other groups, the Education 
Executive Committee would then, in turn, make recommendations to the Yukon government. 
That is, these could be considered to be advisory bodies. 
The next important step proposed by the report is the inclusion of First Nations content in 
the curriculum, a policy aimed at improving the academic achievement of First Nations students 
and reversing the decline in First Nations languages (Ibid.: 1.17). In discussing a new approach 
to the development of curricula, the report concludes that in order to be successful it is necessary 
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to include First Nations values and beliefs. To do this it recommends involving First Nation 
teachers, elders, and leaders in curriculum development. 
When the Education Reform Project Final Report was released in 2008, it was met with 
broad support from its participants. Vuntut Gwitchin Chief Joe Link:later for instance, suggested 
the ERP was a big step and said that "working in partnership, the Yukon government and 
Council of Yukon First Nations will be able ... to make meaningful and sustainable changes" to 
the education system (YTG/CYFN Press Release, February, 2008). Yukon Education Minister 
Patrick Rouble also reiterated the Yukon governments commitment to the outcomes identified in 
the ERP Final Report (Ibid.). Subsequently, the territorial Department of Education developed 
their Strategic Plan for 2011-15 titled "Our Commitment to New Horizons" (YTG, 2010). 
In this report, the Yukon government reiterated its commitment to the proposals of the 
ERP and provided information about the implementation of those proposed recommendations. 
Throughout this document, particular emphasis is given to "partnerships" and "collaboration" 
between Yukon and First Nation governments. It points to initiatives like an "MOU and Action 
Plan" between the governments, and the creation of the "Yukon First Nation Advisory 
Committee" (YTG, 2010) which are being undertaken currently, as evidence of progress. 
Unfortunately, many of these initiatives have not been completed or implemented at the time of 
writing, so it is difficult to assess their structure, operation, or success. During interviews, 
government officials pointed to two particular pilot programs as evidence of the willingness of 
First Nations and Yukon government to work together "collaboratively" or in "partnership" 
(Interview 1, 2010). One of these programs was a bi-cultural language program within the public 
school in Haines Junction, and the other was a land-based experiential program in Old Crow 
designed to get students out on the land. Both of these bilateral programs were coordinated 
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through the Yukon Government's newly created First Nations Programs and Partnerships Unit 
(FNPPU) within the Department of Education. In both cases the Yukon government and 
respective First Nation share the program costs, and the programming is developed by a 
"curriculum working group," made up of elders and cultural leaders from the First Nation in 
question (Interview 2, 201 0). 
While these pilot programs are important to note, there is no information about them in 
print, and officials were hesitant to comment on their success there were so new (Interview 1, 
2010; Interview 2, 2010). Nevertheless, the existence of these types of programs can be 
interpreted as the beginning of a trend towards the type of greater involvement of First Nations in 
the design, development, and delivery of education programs that was contemplated in the 
Education Reform Project. 
Conclusion 
Based on the review conducted here, it is difficult to accurately assess what is happening 
"on the ground," in terms of education in the Yukon. But what can certainly be gleaned from this 
is a general sense of the emerging relationship between the Yukon and First Nation governments, 
and the current trajectory of education programming in Yukon. The most prevalent theme that 
comes out of government documents and interviews with officials is the notion of a "meaningful 
partnership" between Yukon and First Nation governments over the management of education in 
the Yukon. The rationale behind this partnership seems to be twofold: educational and political. 
On one hand, it is widely accepted that there is gap between the educational outcomes of 
Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal students. It is suggested then that by adding Aboriginal content to 
curriculum, it will become more relevant to Aboriginal students and thus improve their 
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educational experience and outcomes. On the political side, First Nation governments can apply 
pressure to the Yukon government by openly contemplating drawing down education. As 
officials note, the Yukon government hope to maintain a single public education system so they 
would prefer to give First Nations greater involvement in education policy rather than risk that 
First Nations will attempt to create a parallel system. In this sense, First Nations can leverage a 
stronger role in the provision of education without having to fully assume complete 
responsibility of policy field. Meanwhile the Yukon government is able to maintain a singular, 
public system where they have ultimate decision-making power. Whatever the reasoning, the 
current situation remains. Both levels of government seem genuinely committed to reforming 
their relationship in terms of education, to allow for greater partnership and collaboration. 
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Applying the Co-Management Framework 
Introduction 
In the earlier section of this paper that focused on the literature on co-management 
regimes in Canada, it was determined that a framework of the characteristics of co-management 
regimes could be identified. This chapter will attempt to determine if the current situation in 
Yukon relating to education can be characterized as co-management using this framework. To 
reiterate, the four criteria of the co-management framework are: the principles underlying the 
origin of the relationship; the composition and structure of the bodies; the power, or authority 
actually practiced by the Aboriginal peoples; and the way Aboriginal voice, or ways of 
expressing and sharing knowledge are incorporated into the structure. 
Origin 
This aspect of the co-management framework determines the rationale behind the 
arrangement and its structure. At a more abstract level, it suggests that co-management regimes 
are a part of a response to historic wrongs perpetrated by the government on Aboriginal peoples, 
and to mending old regimes that are linked broadly to the colonial relationship. The current 
education policy in Yukon surely meets the criterion of the co-management model. The current 
relationship between the Yukon and First Nations governments related to education is clearly 
linked to the historic failures and prejudices of the residential school system. Indeed, the 
paternalism and colonialism that permeated previous education policies can certainly be 
characterized as an 'historic wrong.' 
However the framework contains a more practical aspect of this component as well. It 
suggests that co-management regimes have a very practical common origin which can be 
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described as a "political compromise." That is, in such regimes there is a desire to find a middle 
ground between continued unilateral state control, and absolute Aboriginal control. It seems that 
this aspect also rings true in the case of Yukon education policy. While self-governing First 
Nations have the ability to draw down control of education, there appears to be a real desire for 
most to keep their children within the current system. While it was noted in interviews that at 
least some First Nations were interested in the idea of drawing down education, none have even 
begun negotiating these arrangements. This is possibly because of the increased role in 
curriculum design, development and delivery. Nonetheless, in the case of education policy in 
Yukon, there is most certainly a political compromise between unilateral control by the 
Department of Education, and the assumption of complete control by First Nations. So it appears 
that both the abstract and the practical aspects of this component are met. 
Structure 
The important features relating to the structure of co-management boards noted in the 
framework are two-fold. On one hand, they all provide some form of guaranteed Aboriginal 
representation, usually in the form of reserved seats on a board for Aboriginal-appointed 
members. On the other hand, the boards are intended to be independent of any government 
(Aboriginal or non-Aboriginal), and are supposed to act in the public interest. This is difficult to 
assess in the case of education policy in Yukon, because most of the proposed boards and 
advisory bodies have yet to be created. However, of those proposed, there is evidence of 
guaranteed First Nation participation. All four of the bodies proposed have some amount of 
reserved seats for First Nation-appointed members. In fact, the First Nations Education 
Committee is a specifically First Nation group, and the others all contain strong First Nation 
influence. While their independence from government does not exactly match the framework's 
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conception, the fact that they are all making decisions and recommendations about public 
schools, and issues that affect all children, regardless of their background, suggests that there is a 
very real public aspect to the proposed committees. While it remains to be seen what boards are 
actually implemented and which are not, the desire to allow increased First Nation participation 
in decision-making while simultaneously keeping them in the public system, seems to meet the 
structural criterion of the framework. 
Power 
The component of power is described as the ability of Aboriginal groups to exercise real 
decision-making power over the management of a given resource. The framework describes the 
distinction between making decisions and providing advice, and the corresponding differences of 
opinion as to whether providing advice to a federal or territorial government represents "real" 
power. In the case of education policy in Yukon, it is clear that ultimate power for decision-
making rests with the Yukon Government. Aside from the local school councils, which set the 
day-to-day types of policies, all of the other proposed bodies provide advice and 
recommendations to the Yukon government, which maintains final authority over public schools. 
However, it has been conceded in most documents as well as the interviews conducted, that the 
Yukon and First Nations governments "both have authority over education" (ERP, 2008: B.6). 
This notion of the relinquishment of exclusive authority does appear within the framework. 
An important argument within the power component of the framework is the idea that co-
management bodies wield "actual power." While the proposed bodies only give advice, "it is 
advice with a difference" (Netro and Simmons, 1995: 171). This is based partly on what is 
explained as a "negative option," that can be exercised by the Crown Minister which refers to the 
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fixed window of time in which the Minister can overturn a decision made by a co-management 
body, and the political capital she expends by doing so. 
In the case of education, First Nations can only provide advice to the Yukon government 
on how to run its public education system. However, because First Nations ultimately have the 
option to draw down education, and that it has been noted that this is a factor which the First 
Nation can use to apply pressure to the Yukon government, it certainly seems like this is "advice 
with a difference." However because the ultimate decision-making in education rests with the 
Minister, there does not appear to be the "negative option" onus, as there is in the co-
management framework. 
So it is difficult to assert that this criterion is met entirely. There is however an interesting 
observation that can be made. What seems likely is that the co-management debates about the 
nature of advice-versus-decision-making would transfer over to education almost identically. On 
one side, it could be argued, as Nadasdy does of co-management, that this arrangement simply 
extends the power of the state over First Nations, and that First Nations would become 
bureaucratized in order to participate, which would actually have a negative effect on traditional 
First Nation culture and way of life (Nadasdy, 2003; 2005). On the other hand, proponents of co-
management would probably agree that First Nations input into education policy is indeed 
"advice with a difference." The transferability of the arguments about co-management to the 
field of education, suggests that this aspect of the criteria can probably be checked off. 
Voice 
The final component of "voice" refers to the incorporation into the co-management 
regime of Aboriginal ways and methods of expressing and sharing knowledge. In the case of 
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education, the most comparable aspect would likely be the incorporation of traditional 
knowledge and practice into the curriculum and teaching methods. There is some evidence that 
First Nation culture, pedagogical methods, and traditions are increasingly being implemented in 
the mainstream education policy. The ERP makes some recommendations in this regard. It 
concedes that while specific Aboriginal curriculum could be "successfully delivered within the 
mainstream curriculum," it would "require different instmction and evaluation methods" (ERP, 
2008, 1.18). Further, it argues that more educators with training in traditional practices and 
values are needed, and that new policies "will need to be developed in regard to the 
establishment, monitoring, administration, and evaluation of First Nations curriculum" (1.19). 
The pilot programs in Haines Junction and Old Crow seem to suggest a movement in this 
direction. The success of these programs and the degree to which the Yukon government can 
incorporate traditional knowledge, beliefs, and practices into the mainstream public education 
system will likely be debatable. In a similar manner to the section above on power, it is likely 
that the debates within the co-management literature about "voice," will probably be reflected in 
education policy. Thus it is fair to say that the component of "voice" that appears in the co-
management framework is definitely reflected in Yukon's education policy. 
Conclusion 
The co-management framework helps to explain and understand the ongoing 
development of education policy in Yukon, and the level and type of control that First Nations 
governments have. Education policy shares a common origin with co-management regimes in 
the sense that it is based on a response to the negative legacy of the previous education system, 
and that it is a result of political compromise between self-governing First Nations and the 
Yukon government. While it is difficult to compare the structure of co-management boards 
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directly to the boards that exist in Yukon's education system, they are similar in concept. At this 
point in time, they are designed to incorporate Aboriginal participation while maintaining a 
specifically public system. Fundamental to this public system is the fact that the public 
government (Minister) has the final say in decision-making. Similar to co-management bodies, 
First Nations role can be considered advisory rather than absolute veto power. Finally, within the 
education policy field in Yukon, there is an attempt to incorporate First Nation methods, 
practices, and traditions of expressing knowledge; there is an attempt to bring First Nation 
"voice" to education. 
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Conclusions 
There are a number of conclusions that can be drawn from the current trajectory of 
education policy in Yukon. While the previous chapter concluded that the comparison seems to 
be quite accurate, some concessions must be made. First of all it is important to note that the 
evidence presented in chapter three is intended to represent the direction or trajectory of 
education policy in Yukon. It does not accurately represent what is actually happening "on the 
ground." This is because the majority of proposals have yet to be implemented. This means the 
conclusion is not as simple as characterizing education policy in Yukon currently as a co-
management system. However this does not mean the analysis in the previous chapter is without 
use. It can be argued that if the direction of education policy is accurately represented by the 
evidence presented here, then it would seem that the current direction is leading towards a co-
management system. 
This conclusion has certain important implications. First of all it offers both levels of 
governments, as well as observers, some hint as to how the academic discourse about the 
education system might develop. If indeed the debates about co-management can be transferred 
to education, we can get a sense of what to expect. In co-management there is basically a 
dichotomous division within the literature between proponents and critics of co-management 
regimes and the roles they afford First Nations. A similar dichotomy can be expected about 
Yukon's education policy. On one hand, drawing on the arguments of Paul Nadasdy (2005), 
some academics or observers may find that the attempts to incorporate First Nation content into 
the public school system may in fact undermine that knowledge and further the cultural 
assimilation of First Nations. The necessity of working these practices into the western system 
may in fact bureaucratize First Nations and force them to adopt structures that are inherently 
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incompatible with First Nation culture, in order to participate (Nadasdy, 2003). On the other 
hand, some may find that the system is generally successful in allowing First Nations a 
participatory role and voice in the development, design, and delivery of education programs that 
was previously absent. Either way, in absence of academic attention, the conclusion of the 
similarity between Yukon's education system and co-management regimes in the area of natural 
resource management suggest the literature about the latter may be applied to the former. 
What is also clear is the need for further research on the current, proposed, and future 
structure of the education system in Yukon. Yukon's eleven self-governing First Nations will all 
likely have different relationships with the Yukon government, and different programs and 
services related to education. This paper maintained a broad approach to the overarching trends 
of the relationship between the Yukon government and the First Nation governments, but 
stopped quite short of investigating each respective First Nation. While a general direction was 
concluded in this paper, it is likely that there are as many different directions as there are First 
Nation governments in Yukon. It is entirely possible that any number of individual First Nation 
governments may depart from the trajectory leading towards co-management. This could lead to 
a more unilateral approach by the Yukon government, or to First Nations developing, designing, 
and delivering education programs more autonomously and even completely drawing down 
education. In fact, as the ERP Final Report suggests in its "elements of partnership" section, 
"partnerships should be transitional in nature" and "could potentially assist those First Nations 
who choose to exercise authority over their educational systems" (ERP: 1.1-1.5). In any event, 
there is much that remains to be seen regarding education policy in Yukon. 
Finally, this conclusion does offer some insight into what was described earlier as a gap 
between the potential model of self-government and the current model being practiced in Yukon. 
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Co-management is conceived at least partly, as a political compromise between Aboriginal and 
non-Aboriginal governments. In education policy in Yukon, there is certainly a political 
compromise between continued unilateral control of education programming by the Yukon 
government, and complete assumption of control by First Nation governments. This political 
compromise represents a new direction available to First Nations that is different than simply 
striving for the complete potential outlined in the Final and Self-Government Agreements. In 
other words, the political compromise noted in education could be extrapolated to other parts or 
aspects of self-government. This is important because it means that both First Nation and Yukon 
governments and citizens do not have to continue to conceive of the agreements as representing 
the inevitable future. In the case of education, the gap between the potential model and the 
current model is being filled by co-management style political compromise. It is entirely possible 
this could happen in other policy jurisdictions as well. 
Furthermore, even if these political compromises are seen as "transitional," and simply a 
means to the "potential" model of self-government, we must remember the factors that inhibit 
First Nations from more fulsome implementation of self-government. It has been argued 
previously that the most prominent factors which inhibit First Nations from fully implementing 
their agreements are adequate capacity, adequate finance, and adequate time. The amount of each 
of these has not been calculated, but if the size of the First Nations, their current funding, and the 
extent of the power they have available to them are considered, those amounts must surely be 
considerable. So even if some sort of political compromise is seen as a transitional phase it is not 
difficult to conceive of that phase lasting a very long time. 
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